Blar i forfatter "Pereau, Jean Christophe"

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    • Bargaining with asymmetric externalities 

      Pereau, Jean Christophe; Clark, Derek J. (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2007-02)
      We consider sequential bargaining between three firms that are all essential in creating a surplus. One of the firms is dominant in the sense that it ultimately decides whether the surplus will be created. The other firms have an incentive to get a large share of the pie for themselves, but leaving enough for the dominant firm that it finds it profitable to create the surplus. Hence, the smaller ...

    • Merger and bilateral bargaining : A note 

      Clark, Derek J.; Musy, Olivier; Pereau, Jean Christophe (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2008-02-05)
      In a context of bilateral bargaining between an upstream supplier and several downstream buyers, this note determines the conditions under which two buyers have an incentive to merge depending on whether (i) the bargaining process is simultaneous or sequential and (ii) the post merger buyer becomes pivotal or not. We also determine conditions under which the players will prefer to bargain ...

    • Simultaneous versus sequential offers in dominant player bargaining 

      Clark, Derek J.; Pereau, Jean Christophe (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2008-01-10)
      We consider bargaining between a number of players that are all essential in creating a surplus. One of the players is dominant in the sense that it ultimately decides whether the surplus will be created. The other players have an incentive to get a large share of the pie for themselves, but leaving enough for the dominant firm that it finds it profitable to create the surplus. Hence, the smaller ...

    • Vertical integration through Rubinstein bargaining 

      Clark, Derek John; Pereau, Jean Christophe (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2012)
      We consider a vertical structure in which an upstream manufacturer bargains with a downstream retailer over the price of an intermediate good. In an alternating offers framework, we show that when the managers of the firms can choose their response time in the negotiation that the solution conforms either to the non-intergrated or fully integrated structure from standard models of successive monopoly.